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INTRODUCTION
Oklahoma's political history is no stranger to a basic distrust of corporations.I Up-
on statehood in 1907, the same year Congress passed the Tillman Act prohibiting corpo-
rations and national banks from contributing to federal campaigns, Oklahoma's Constitu-
tion prohibited corporations from influencing state elections.2 Although there are several
instances of politicians engaging in relationships with corporate officials that qualify as
criminal conduct, such relationships do not always involve outright forms of corruption.3
Consider, for instance, the 2011 City Council elections in Oklahoma City. 4 The
race for ward two was between Ed Shadid and Charlie Swinton, and the outcome was a
true under-dog story.5 Shadid led a modest, self-financed campaign, which is likely what
most assume to be typical in city council elections.6 On the other hand, Swinton received
strong financial support from the Committee for Oklahoma City Momentum ("COCM"),
which spent over $400,000 in campaign expenditures for Swinton and three other city
council candidates. 7
Because COCM supported Swinton's campaign and the other candidates through
campaign expenditures - as opposed to making direct campaign contributions - the
amount COCM spent was not subject to the $5,000 limit placed on campaign contribu-
tions.8 Additionally, COCM did not exist until shortly before the election, which lent fur-
ther proof of the group's primary purpose of financially influencing Swinton's cam-
paign.9
COCM received its funds from "A Better Oklahoma City, Inc.," a 501(c) non-
profit group that is not required to list its individual donors.10 However, reports that sur-
faced after the election indicated that a group named "Forward OKC IV" contributed to
1. See OK. CONST. art. IX, § 40.
2. Id; Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864, 865 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441(b) (2006)), invalidated by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see Andrew T. Newcomer,
Comment, The "Crabbed View of Corruption": How the U.S. Supreme Court Has Given Corporations the
Green Light to Gain Influence Over Politicians by Spending on Their Behalf[Citizens United v. Federal Elec-
tion Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)], 50 WASHBURN L.J. 235, 247 (2010) (discussing a brief history of the
Tillman Act).
3. See Michael Baker, Oklahoma Elections: Ed Shadid Wins Oklahoma City Council Ward 2 Seat,
NEWSOK (Apr. 5, 2011), http://newsok.com/oklahoma-elections-ed-shadid-wins-oklahoma-city-council-ward-
2-seat/article/3555775. Although this article discusses the corporate influence in a municipal election, which is
not governed by the same laws as state elections, the corporation's role in this election is relevant for purposes
of this article. See also Tony Thorton, Steve Phipps Accuses Others, NEWSOK (Oct. 26, 2008),
http://newsok.com/steve-phipps-accuses-others/article/3315606 (discussing a criminal scheme in which former
businessman Steve Phipps made illegal campaign contributions to several Oklahoma politicians, including
former Representatives Mike Mass and Randall Erwin, in exchange for the funneling of Oklahoma taxpayer
money to Phipps' business).





9. Id. The proof of COCM's purpose was evident in the fact that the public had no way of knowing the
COCM's actual donors, which Shadid claimed was beneficial to his campaign because the constituents did not
appreciate the idea of "anonymous money." Id.
10. Dana Hertneky, Group Spends Nearly Half Million Dollars on City Council Election, KOTV
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the group. Forward OKC IV's members include two of Oklahoma's largest corpora-
tions, Devon Energy and Chesapeake. 12
Swinton's significant financial support from COCM led to Shadid's public criti-
cism of Swinton for his obligations to special interest groups.13 Shadid concluded that
his victory over Swinton and COCM's large expenditures through undisclosed individual
donors indicated that Oklahomans "want anonymous money out of their elections." 1 4
Although the public's knowledge of the large expenditures supporting Swinton - com-
pared to Shadid's modest, self-financed campaign - arguably helped Shadid win the
race, the opponents of the other three COCM-backed candidates were not as fortunate. 15
The existence of this type of corporate influence through campaign expenditures
makes the proposed amendments to Oklahoma's campaign finance laws a serious threat
to the interests of state constituents.16 These proposed amendments surfaced after the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Citizens United," which lifted the long-time regulations
on expenditures by corporations and labor unions in federal elections. 18 The repeal of
similar regulations in Oklahoma through the adoption of these amendments will make
political races like that between Shadid and Swinton a more frequent occurrence and de-
crease the likelihood of success for self-financed candidates such as Shadid. 19 However,
if the amendments are enacted in conjunction with amendments to the state's disclosure
requirements, then the voting population would know which candidates corporations
supported and give candidates like Shadid a fighting chance.20 If enacted without
amended disclosure requirements, the proposed amendments concerning corporate ex-
penditures could result in the replacement of constituent interests with the special inter-
ests of wealthy contributors by allowing corporations to make unlimited expenditures
from their general treasury funds without disclosure of the corporations' role.2 1
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. Baker, supra note 3.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Marie Price, State Must Change Campaign-Spending to Comply with Citizens United Decision,
Panel Told, THE JOURNAL REC. LEGIs. REP. (Sept. 20, 2011), http://joumalrecord.com/23rd-and-
Lincolni/2011/09/20/state-must-change-campaign-spending-statutes-to-comply-with-citizens-united-decision-
panel-told/.
17. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
18. Id. at 917. While the decision allows independent expenditures by other groups such as labor unions,
this article focuses on the influence of corporations.
19. Baker, supra note 3; Price, supra note 16.
20. Strengthened disclosure requirements drafted by the Oklahoma Ethics Commission in December 2011
that would account for sources and amounts of corporate independent expenditures under the new law can be
found at OKLA. ETHICS COMM'N, RULES OF THE ETHICS COMM'N PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND/OR DRAFTS
FOR THE 2012 LEGIS. SESSION, 8-10 (Dec. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.ok.gov/oec/documents/AMENDDEC.1l.pdf [hereinafter PROPOSED AMENDMENTS]. These
amendments, however, were not presented to the Oklahoma State Legislature.
21. See OKLA. ETHICS COMM'N, LEGISLATIVE CHANGES: ETHICS COMM'N RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 2011
SESSION (Feb. 7, 2011), available at http://joumalrecord.com/23rd-and-Lincoln/2011/06/22/speaker-seeks-
update-of-oklahoma-campaign-finance-laws-in-light-of-citizens-united-decision [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE
CHANGES]. This source includes the proposed amendments to OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 187-187.2 (2012).
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This article examines the corruptive corporate influence that can inevitably result
from the effects of the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United on Oklahoma's cam-
paign finance laws without also amending the disclosure requirements.22 Part I discusses
the history of Congress's attempts to regulate the role of corporations in campaign fi-
nance.23 Part I also discusses some of the major Supreme Court decisions involving chal-
lenges to federal campaign finance laws enacted to address the role of corporations in
elections, as well as the laws in Oklahoma that mirrored these decisions up until Citizens
United.24 Part II examines the Supreme Court's decisions in detail and recounts the path
to, and the aftermath of, Citizens United.25 Part III discusses current Oklahoma law and
its regulations on corporate campaign practices. 26 Part IV discusses and analyzes the
proposed amendments and their possible effects on campaign finance in Oklahoma state
elections and the recent changes in the federal election system as a result of Citizens
United.27 Part IV also examines the realistic value of the possible effects in Oklahoma as
compared to the present state of the federal system, as well as the need for the enactment
of strengthened disclosure requirements to combat the effects resulting from the growing
power of corporations in campaign finance.28 Part V provides concluding remarks for
this article. 29
I. BACKGROUND
A. A History of Corruption
Attempts to limit the role of corporations in elections began in early American his-
tory.30 Some believe that the fear of corporate influence escalated during the Civil War
as corporations contributed money to elections in exchange for government contracts.3 1
However, Congress's first major attempt to address corporate campaign contributions did
not occur until 1907 with the Tillman Act.32 For the first time, corporations and national
banks were prohibited from contributing money to any political campaign.33 President
Roosevelt strongly advocated for the Tillman Act, and its provisions were aimed at
22. See LEGISLATIVE CHANGES, supra note 21; see also PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 20, at 8-10;
see generally OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 187-187.2 (2012).
23. See infra notes 30-41.
24. See infra notes 42-83.
25. See infra notes 84-174.
26. See infra notes 175-90.
27. See discussion infra Part IV.A-C.
28. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
29. See discussion infra Part V.
30. See United States v. Int'l Union United Auto. 352 U.S. 567, 570-84 (1957) (discussing in detail the
history of Congress's attempts to limit the role of corporations in elections before holding that the appellee la-
bor union violated the Corrupt Practices Act).
31. Newcomer, supra note 2, at 246. According to Newcomer, President Lincoln feared corporations would
contribute to candidates in elections to gain political influence. Id.
32. Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864, 865 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441(b)
(2006)), invalidated by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); Int'l Union United Auto.,
352 U.S. at 575.
33. See sources cited supra note 32.
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maintaining the role of the individual in the democratic process.34
In 1909, some members of Congress feared the ability of corporations to find other
ways to influence elections. 3 5 These congressmen wanted to address this potential prob-
lem by expanding the Tillman Act to state legislative actions by prohibiting donations of
any kind from corporations or national banks in both state and federal elections.36 These
attempts, however, were unsuccessful. 37
Congress finally pushed through another major reform in 1925 with the Corrupt
Practices Act ("CPA").38 The CPA expanded limitations on corporations by broadly
prohibiting both monetary and non-monetary contributions. 39 This legislation, aimed at
addressing the fear of political corruption resulting from large corporate contributions,
was a significant move toward congressional regulation of campaign funding.40 Al-
though Congress passed additional regulations on corporations, the most significant re-
form did not occur until over sixty years after President Roosevelt pushed Congress to
pass the Tillman Act.41
B. Supreme Court Decisions
Following the enactment of various regulations in the 1970s, the Supreme Court
addressed many issues in campaign finance reform.42 In these cases, recurring issues in-
volved the role corporations play in funding political campaigns and the appropriate lev-
el of regulation. 43 The Court laid the foundation for its treatment of campaign finance
issues when it addressed Congress's largest move toward reform in Buckley v. Valeo.44
The case involved constitutional challenges to the formation of the Federal Election
Commission ("FEC") and the enactment of the Federal Election Campaign Act
("FECA").45 Certain provisions in FECA limited both monetary contributions - made
directly to candidates or their campaign committees - and expenditures, which include
independent spending that supports or opposes "a clearly identified candidate." 46 The
decision upheld campaign contribution limitations, but declared limitations on campaign
expenditures unconstitutional. 47 The distinction between contributions and expenditures
was important because it effectively made expenditures the primary funding method for




38. Id. at 576.
39. Id. at 577.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 577-78; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1976) (discussing constitutional chal-
lenges to the new regulations under FECA and the formation of the FEC).
42. See generally J. Robert Abraham, Note, Saving Buckley: Creating a Stable Campaign Finance Frame-
work, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1078 (2010) (conducting an extensive study of Supreme Court cases addressing
campaign finance reform). For purposes of this article, only Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), and Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) will be discussed.
43. See Abraham, supra note 42, at 1078.
44. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6.
45. Id. at 6-7; see Abraham, supra note 42, at 1078.
46. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 12-13 (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 38, 47-48.
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candidates' campaign supporters. 4 8
In 2002, Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act ("BCRA") in re-
action to a disturbing investigation of contributors circumventing disclosure require-
ments and gaining access to political candidates through large expenditures in the 1996
presidential elections.4 9 BCRA's purpose was to prevent corporations and other outside
groups from escaping disclosure requirements of large expenditures and electioneering
communications by claiming the money was spent on issue advocacy. 50 The Court dealt
with challenges to this legislation the following year in McConnell v. FEC.5 1 In
McConnell, the Court upheld the prohibition on corporate independent expenditures ex-
cept through political action committees ("PAC" or "PACs"), or separate segregated
funds.52 The new BCRA disclosure requirements for expenditures constituting election-
eering communications - those "made within thirty days of a primary" or "sixty days of
a general" election and that "refer[] to a clearly identified candidate" - were also up-
held.53 The Court felt this decision was consistent with prior holdings that found a need
to regulate the influence of wealthy contributors in elections. 54
The Citizens United decision marked a strong departure from the Court's past em-
phasis on corporate regulations in campaign finance. 55 The majority found that the First
Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech protected corporations and their ability to
make expenditures expressly advocating for a candidate.56 In other words, the Citizens
United majority held that corporations could make unlimited expenditures through their
general treasury funds, which effectively overruled laws that existed since shortly after
the Buckley decision in 1976.57
C. Oklahoma Law
The current Oklahoma laws addressing the role of corporations in campaign fi-
nance mirror the federal laws enacted shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in
58Buckley. The laws also conform to the limitations on corporate expenditures upheld in
McConnell.59 Under Oklahoma law, an expenditure is defined as "a purchase, payment,
48. See Abraham, supra note 42, at 1078-79.
49. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 131-32 (2003).
50. Id. The Court defined "issue advocacy," as opposed to "express advocacy," as political advertisements
for or against an identified candidate that did not use the "magic words" such as "elect" or "vote." Because
FECA only required disclosure of expenditures that were made in express advocacy, i.e., by using the magic
words, funds raised for the purpose of issue advocacy were not subject to disclosure requirements. Id at 125-
26.
51. Id at 132-33.
52. Id at 204-06, 209.
53. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2002); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 208-09.
54. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205.
55. See generally Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign Finance After
Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 643 (2011) (discussing the public outcry after and implica-
tions of the Court's decision).
56. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876, 908 (2010).
57. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 901-02.
58. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 187-187.2 (2012). See 2 U.S.C. §441b for the federal law.
59. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 187.2(b)(2) (2012); see McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204-05 (upholding the corporate
expenditure limits in 2 U.S.C. § 441b).
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distribution, loan, advance, compensation, reimbursement, fee deposit, transfer of funds
between committees, or a gift made by a committee." 60 It does not include corporate
communications "except a communication by the corporation's political action commit-
tee promoting or opposing a candidate or candidates." 6 1 This provision limits the ability
of a corporation to make expenditures for campaign funding purposes unless it forms a
PAC for that purpose.62 Corporations are also prohibited from making campaign contri-
butions, and the statute provides penalties for willful violations of these provisions. 63
In response to the Supreme Court's ruling in Citizens United, then Oklahoma
Speaker of the House, Kris Steele, initiated a study in June 2011 of the state's campaign
finance laws.64 Although the FEC had not yet amended its regulations to conform to Cit-
izens United, lawsuits were already filed in some states that challenged laws not in com-
pliance with the Court's ruling.65 Steele claimed he wanted to study current Oklahoma
law "while ensuring the integrity of [Oklahoma's] electoral process and the freedom of
individuals and entities of Oklahoma." 66
Even before the Speaker's statement of his planned investigation, Oklahoma's
laws prohibiting corporate expenditures did not comply with federal law under Citizens
United.67 As a result of the January 2010 decision, politicians discussed their concerns
that the state's campaign finance laws were unenforceable.68 In these communications,
then Attorney General, Drew Edmonson, stated that he planned to inform state prosecu-
tors that the Oklahoma laws were no longer enforceable. 69
The Oklahoma Ethics Commission ("OEC") drafted amendments to the current
laws that would bring Oklahoma in compliance with federal law during the spring 2011
legislative session.70 Once passed, these amendments will allow corporations to make
unlimited expenditures through their general treasury funds under Oklahoma law, but
corporations will still be prohibited from making contributions. These amendments
will also allow corporations to directly fund electioneering communications such as ad-
vertisements, short films, or other forms of advocacy in media.72 A corporation wanting
to make such expenditures could sue the state on the grounds that its current corporate
60. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 187(8).
61. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 187(8)(b).
62. Id.
63. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 187.2(A), (E)-(F).
64. Marie Price, Speaker Seeks Update of Oklahoma Campaign Finance Laws in Light of Citizens United





67. Clifton Adcock, 'Out of Compliance': Could Some of Oklahoma's Laws Regulating Corporate Dona-
tions be at Odds with Federal Case Law?, OKLA. GAZETTE (June 8, 2011),
http://www.okgazette.com/oklahoma/article- 11911 -%E2%80%98out-of-compliance%E2%80%99.html.
68. Id. These discussions took place in February 2010, and involved then Attorney General, Drew Edmon-




72. See Price, supra note 64.
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expenditure prohibitions do not comply with federal law if these amendments are not
passed.73
Additional studies were conducted after the amendments were not passed during
the 2011 legislative session. 74 On September 20, 2011, state legislators listened to the
findings of the committee studying the issue, as well as input from OEC officials. 75 Alt-
hough some legislators expressed reluctance to allow corporations unlimited freedom in
independent expenditures, OEC officials urged that the change was necessary under fed-
eral law.76 The officials further emphasized the need for this change because of the ten-
dency for law firms to sue states that do not comply with federal law. 7
In December 2011, the OEC drafted additional disclosure requirements with the
amendments allowing corporate independent expenditures.78 The amended disclosure
requirements track the identity of supporters who contribute a certain amount in both
campaign contributions and expenditures. 79 The purpose of the disclosure requirements
is to decrease the potential corporate influence by requiring corporations and other
groups to disclose the amount they spend in Oklahoma elections.80 While these strength-
ened disclosure requirements have not been presented to the Oklahoma State Legislature,
the OEC hopes the legislature will pass the amendments to campaign expenditures in
conjunction with the disclosure requirements to both comply with federal law and com-
bat the effects of the new law through public disclosure. 8 1
A number of states have already enacted legislation that conforms to Citizens Unit-
ed, but adding Oklahoma to the list could be detrimental to the state's election system if
adequate disclosure requirements are not also enacted.82 If the proposed amendments to
Oklahoma's limitations on corporate expenditures are enacted without additional disclo-
sure requirements, corporations would be permitted to make independent expenditures
73. Id.
74. See Adcock, supra note 67.
75. Price, supra note 16. The House Speaker at the time, Kris Steele, asked the House Rules Committee to
conduct a study of Oklahoma's current campaign finance law. The officials from the Oklahoma Ethics Com-
mission who spoke at this presentation included the agency's then general counsel, Rebecca Adams, and then
acting director, Marilyn Hughes. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Marie Price, Commission to Grapple with Proposed Ethics Law Changes Driven by Court Decisions
Expanding Political Speech Protection to Corporations, THE JOURNAL REc. LEGIS. REP. (Dec. 15, 2011),
http://jrlr.net/23rd-and-Lincoln/2011/12/15/commission-to-grapple-with-ethics-law-changes-driven-by-court-
decisions-expanding-political-speech-protection-to-corporations/.
79. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 20, at 8-10; see Price, supra note 78.
80. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 20, at 8-10; see also Price, supra note 78.
81. See Price, supra note 78. In May of 2012, the OEC passed amendments that only require disclosure
when the donation is made "for the purpose of' making a contribution, independent expenditure, or electioneer-
ing communication. OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, ch. 62, App. § 257:10-1-14(a)(13) (2012); see also OKLA. STAT. tit.
74, ch. 62, App. § 257:1-1-2 (2012) (defining "for the purpose of"). In essence, these provisions would allow a
corporation to escape disclosure by claiming the donation was not given "for the purpose of' making a cam-
paign contribution or independent expenditure. Thus, as this article argues, stronger disclosure requirements are
necessary to identify the source and amount of independent expenditures in every situation.
82. See Life After Citizens United: State Laws Affected by Citizens United, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19607 (last updated Jan. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Life Af-
ter Citizens United] (listing the number of states with laws that conflict with Citizens United, the number of
states that have changed their laws, and the states that have yet to do so).
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through their general treasury funds without disclosure of the sources, thereby corrupting
Oklahoma elections by minimizing the voices of constituents while promoting corporate
ideology. 83
II. THE ROAD To CITIZENS UNITED
A. Buckley v. Valeo
The 1976 Supreme Court ruling in Buckley v. Valeo marked the beginning of a
long line of cases addressing campaign finance reform.84 The case dealt with constitu-
tional challenges to FECA and the creation of the FEC.85 The multiple parties who
brought challenges included, but were not limited to, candidates for federal office and
political parties. 86 The plaintiffs argued that the new legislation was unconstitutional be-
cause the regulation of campaign funding infringed freedom of speech under the First
Amendment.87 Because money is the primary form of expression in the election process,
the plaintiffs argued, the regulation of monetary expression by limiting campaign contri-
butions and expenditures in elections violates freedom of speech.8 8 In defense of these
regulations, the government argued that contributions and expenditures are within its
power to regulate because such limitations regulate conduct and not speech.8 9
In its discussion of the new limitations on contributions and expenditures, the
Court examined the "governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance
of corruption." 90 Limitations on campaign contributions were upheld, but expenditure
limitations were deemed unconstitutional. 91 The Court held expenditure limitations
failed to serve the government's interest in minimizing the potential for corruption in the
federal election process.92 In reaching this conclusion, the Court drew a distinction be-
tween the interests served by contribution limitations versus those served by expenditure
limitations. 9 3 On one hand, expenditure limitations independent of candidates did not
serve any interest "sufficient to justify the restriction on the quantity of political expres-
sion" while limitations of contributions made directly to candidates served "[t]he interest
in alleviating the corrupting influence of large contributions." 94
83. See LEGISLATIVE CHANGES, supra note 21, for the amendments to corporate expenditures. See
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 20, for the disclosure amendments.
84. See Abraham, supra note 42, at 1078.
85. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1976). Although the appointment of the FEC was an important issue
in the Court's decision, it is not a focus of this article.
86. Id. at 7-9.
87. Id. at 11.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 15.
90. Id. at 45.
91. Id. at 38, 47-48.
92. Id. at 47-48.
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While the Court ruled on other various provisions of FECA, an important part of
the decision involved the possible corruption caused by large campaign contributions. 95
The Court introduced this idea when it stated "[t]o the extent that large contributions are
given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the in-
tegrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined."96 The main difference
between contributions and expenditures that the Court identified was that contributions
involve money given directly to a candidate's campaign, and the amount of money given
must be publicly disclosed.97 If this amount of money is unlimited, the Court reasoned,
then the public may assume (correctly, in some cases) that there is an inherently corrupt
relationship between a candidate and his largest contributor. 98
The Court observed that expenditures, on the other hand, are not directly contribut-
ed to a candidate's campaign, but, rather, they involve spending "relative to a clearly
identified candidate." 99 Therefore, limiting campaign spending, if independent of the
candidate, was unnecessary to prevent corruption.loo The Court also held that only ex-
penditures that expressly advocated for or against a candidate required disclosure to the
public to prevent an unconstitutionally over-inclusive regulation on political speech
through expenditures.lot Thus, the "reality or appearance of corruption" from quid pro
quo relationships between candidates and wealthy contributors was sufficient for the
Court to uphold the limitations on contributions, but the Court did not find that expendi-
tures posed the same threat of corruption. 102
The definition of quid pro quo corruption in Buckley received some criticism for
failing to address a large potential for corruption in groups that seek to buy political in-
fluence through large contributions. 103 This narrow definition ignored the potential for
corruption through corporations and other groups who were willing to fund candidates in
other ways besides directly contributing to the candidate's campaign to encourage corpo-
rate political interests.104 However, the Court's analysis of contributions verses expendi-
tures and the possibility for political corruption in Buckley served as an important dis-
tinction in later campaign finance cases. 105
95. Id. at 27; Abraham, supra note 42, at 1085-86.
96. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27. The Court's idea of "quid pro quo" corruption stems from the possibility of
elected officials using their position for the benefit of their most wealthy contributors.
97. See id. at 27-29.
98. Id.
99. Id at 41-42.
100. Id at 43-44.
101. Id. at 45.
102. Id at 28, 45.
103. See Kurt Hohenstein, "Clio, Meet Buckley - Buckley, Clio ": Re-Introducing History to Unravel the
Tangle of Campaign Finance Reform, I ALB. Gov'T L. REv. 63, 69-70 (2008).
104. Id. at 70.
105. See id at 71-72.
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B. McConnell v. FEC
The potential for corruption in federal elections became a reality the Court faced in
McConnell v. FEC.106 McConnell involved constitutional challenges to BCRA, which
Congress enacted in 2002 in response to findings of a senate committee that investigated
campaign practices in the 1996 elections. 107 The committee found that many corpora-
tions made large expenditures and electioneering communications to gain access to polit-
ical candidates. 108 Corporations spent large amounts of money in elections not to support
the candidates' ideals, but because they wanted to influence congressional decision-
making. 109 In doing so, many corporations circumvented the 1971 FECA disclosure re-
quirements by making large expenditures in support of, or in opposition to, federal can-
didates through the use of issue advocacy and "soft money."' 10
Corporations and other groups avoided disclosure requirements through a permis-
sible method under the construction of FECA that the Court upheld in Buckley.111 These
groups organized as 527 committees or 501(c) corporations to make expenditures in sup-
port of or in opposition to a particular candidate.112 Then, the entity made expenditures
that identified the candidate, usually concerning an issue, but the expenditures did not
use the "magic words" - vote for, elect, oppose - by expressly calling for the election
or defeat of the candidate.113 Under the Court's holding in Buckley, FECA did not re-
quire disclosure of expenditures that did not both clearly identify the candidate and use
the magic words, and such expenditures were considered issue advocacy. 114 Therefore,
corporations could support candidates in federal campaigns through their general treas-
ury funds in an unregulated method. 115
Corporate executives used large issue advertising expenditures to buy in-person
time with federal candidates, similar to the infamous "White House coffees," wherein
corporate executives could discuss their legislative interests with the President.116 The
senate committee report proved that numerous candidates from both parties held similar
meetings in which wealthy supporters sought political influence by gaining access to pol-
106. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 122 (2003).
107. Id. at 129-30, 134. The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs issued these findings in a 1998
report. The report consisted of six volumes and described the practices of certain campaign contributors who
attempted to gain exclusive access to federal candidates. Id at 129-31.
108. Id. at 130-31.
109. Id. at 124-25.
110. The Court defined "soft money" as monetary donations to political parties made by corporations and
labor unions that were not subject to disclosure requirements under FECA. Id. at 122-23. These donations were
not subject to disclosure because corporations and labor unions claimed they were made for the purpose of in-
fluencing state and local elections, and were therefore non-federal donations that were outside the regulation of
FECA. Id.
111. Id. at 126; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976).
112. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126-28; see 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(1)-(c)(6) (2012); see also 26 U.S.C. § 527
(2012). Corporations and other outside groups prefer to contribute to these tax exempt organizations because
they are not required to list their individual donors.
113. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126-28.
114. Id.; see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45.
115. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 127-28.
116. Id. at 130 (citing S. REP. No. 105-167, vol. 4, at 41-42, 195-200). These "White House coffees" in-
volved President Clinton meeting with corporate executives who contributed millions to the President's cam-
paign. Id. at 130 n.28.
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iticians. 117
In response to the ability of corporations to avoid FEC regulation, Title II of
BCRA prohibited "corporations and labor unions from using general treasury funds for
communications that are intended to, or have the effect of, influencing the outcome of
federal elections."ll8 Title II, Section 203 of BCRA expanded the regulation of corpora-
tions by prohibiting them from using their general treasury funds in issue advocacy
through electioneering communications. 119 To prevent circumvention through issue ad-
vocacy, BCRA's disclosure requirements extended those under FECA by requiring dis-
closure of funds used in electioneering communications, which included advertisements
that identified a federal candidate without use of the magic words and were aired within
thirty days of a primary election or sixty days of a general election. 120
The McConnell plaintiffs asserted several constitutional challenges to various sec-
tions of BCRA. 12 1 The plaintiffs claimed that the regulations violated freedom of speech
under the First Amendment, the Elections Clause, equal protection under the Due Pro-
cess Clause, and that the regulations were void for over-breadth.122 The Court carefully
compared these challenges to the interests served by BCRA.123
The opinion recognized Congress' authority to regulate corporations in federal
elections since the 1976 Buckley decision.124 The Court also noted that the prohibition
on funding through corporations' general treasury funds - while not an issue in the case
- was constitutional and did not create a complete ban on corporate funding because
corporate expenditures, though subject to regulation, were still permissible.125 For in-
stance, a corporation could make these expenditures by creating a separate segregated
fund, or PAC.126
The Court based its holding on prior rulings of legislation enacted to combat "the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated
with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's
support for the corporation's political ideas." 1 27 The Court struck down the constitution-
al challenges to Title II.128 The congressional findings of corporate practices, such as the
financing of numerous campaign ads that aired shortly before federal elections through
unregulated and undisclosed funding, further influenced the Court's decision. 129 There-
fore, the Court upheld BCRA's expanded regulation of corporations and disclosure re-
quirements. 130
117. Id. at 130-31.
118. Id. at 132.
119. Id. at 204.
120. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2012); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204.
121. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 134.
122. Id. at 134, 158-59.
123. See id at 134-35.
124. Id. at 203.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 204.
127. Id. at 205 (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).
128. Id. at 207.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 209.
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The McConnell decision was important for many reasons, but primarily because it
recognized the need to amend FECA due to the rise in the number of groups capable of
circumventing the disclosure requirements by omitting the magic words in large cam-
paign expenditures. 13 1 The cases following Buckley influenced the Court's emphasis in
McConnell on preventing corruption by regulating corporate spending and requiring dis-
closure of such spending. 132 In sharp contrast to Citizens United, McConnell also
marked the Court's willingness to show deference to Congress to enact legislation aimed
at regulating the use of soft money and issue advocacy, thereby minimizing the corrup-
tive role of corporations in federal elections.133
C. Citizens United v. FEC
In Citizens United, the Court overruled its prior decisions involving corporate
campaign expenditures. 134 Citizens United was a non-profit corporation that brought an
action to run advertisements for its film, Hillary: The Movie, criticizing Hillary Clin-
ton. 135 The organization feared it could not run these advertisements due to the election-
eering communication prohibition upheld in McConnell.136 In addition, Citizens United
wanted to air the film shortly before the primary election. 137 The non-profit argued it
could do so because the limitations on corporate expenditures in electioneering commu-
nications were unconstitutional and should not apply to the film.138 Not only did the
Court find the film fell within the statute, but it also addressed Citizens United's consti-
tutional challenge that the statute violated freedom of speech, which was a claim that the
organization dismissed from its original complaint. 139
The Court began its free speech analysis by criticizing the extent of regulations on
campaign finance imposed by the PAC requirement.140 In the five-four decision, Justice
Kennedy compared subjecting corporations to FEC prosecution if they do not abide by
the PAC requirement to sixteenth and seventeenth century licensing laws in England. 14 1
He further claimed that the First Amendment was meant to prevent such regulations. 142
Kennedy went on to criticize the PAC options for corporations under section 441b by
claiming they were "burdensome alternatives," "expensive to administer and subject to
extensive regulations." 143 The Court ultimately found that the prohibition on corporate
131. See Joshua Downie, Note, McConnell v. FEC: Supporting Congress and Congress's Attempt at Cam-
paign Finance Reform, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 927, 928 (2004).
132. See id. at 936-37.
133. See id at 936.
134. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010).
135. Id. at 886-87. Citizens United argued that 2 U.S.C. § 441b(2) (2006), the disclosure, and the disclaimer
requirements of BCRA were unconstitutional, and the organization filed an injunction against enforcement of
these provisions. Id. at 888.
136. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(2); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887-88.
137. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888.
138. Id. at 888.
139. Id. at 891-92.
140. Id. at 895-96.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 896.
143. Id. at 897.
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independent expenditures violated the First Amendment notwithstanding the PAC op-
tion. 144
In addressing the issue of the disclosure requirements for electioneering communi-
cations, the Court first noted that the documentary criticizing Hillary Clinton was a form
of express advocacy because it clearly called for her defeat.14 5 Under the Court's holding
in McConnell, a corporation could not fund a film such as Hillary on its own, but it could
do so by creating a PAC or separate segregated fund.146 Additionally, the donations to
the PAC required disclosure if the electioneering communication either expressly called
for the election or defeat of a candidate (express advocacy), or if it referenced a clearly
identified candidate and was aired within a certain time period before an election or pri-
mary (electioneering communication).147 The Court found that the disclosure require-
ments were valid, but overruled the long-standing prohibition on corporate independent
expenditures. 14 8 The decision therefore permitted corporations to make independent ex-
penditures through their general treasury funds without the "burdensome alternatives" of
a PAC or separate segregated fund. 14 9 Further, corporate independent expenditures did
not require disclosure as long as they qualified as issue advocacy and were not election-
eering communications aired within the specified time frame before elections. 150
The Court claimed that its holding was based on Buckley, but as Justice Kennedy
noted, the ban on corporate independent expenditures was not addressed in Buckley. 151
The statute encompassing this ban took effect shortly after the Buckley decision.152 In
his dissent, Justice Stevens observed that the prohibition on corporate expenditures was
not an absolute ban because of the separate segregated fund or PAC option.1 53 He
claimed that the majority provided insufficient support for its assertion that these options
were overly burdensome. 154 Further, he found the overruling of corporate regulations
unnecessary because no party in Citizens United asked the Court to do so.155
Justice Stevens also criticized the majority's holding and its willingness to ignore
long-standing precedent.156 He felt the overruling of the corporate expenditure prohibi-
tion would allow corporations to spend as much money from their general treasury funds
as they wanted in promoting a certain candidate. 157 He found that the majority ignored
the legislative findings in McConnell, Congress's attempt to prevent this outcome, and
the ability of corporations to circumvent disclosure requirements. 158 Justice Stevens and
144. Id. at 913.
145. Id. at 890.
146. Id. at 897.
147. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2012); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887.
148. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913-14.
149. Id. at 897, 913.
150. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913-14.
151. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 942-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 941.
156. Id. at 938-39.
157. Id. at 940.
158. Id. at 956-57.
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the other dissenting Justices predicted that this unlimited spending would enhance the
role of corporations and their interests in federal elections.159
Stevens also noted that perhaps the most disturbing aspect of ignoring prior hold-
ings was the narrow definition of quid pro quo corruption adopted by the majority. 160 He
believed the legislative findings discussed in McConnell were sufficient evidence of the
potential corruption of corporations' influence on political candidates through large ex-
penditures.161 The dissent further criticized the narrow view of corruption through actual
quid pro quo arrangements among corporations and political candidates embraced by the
majority by predicting that corporations would use independent expenditures to promote
their interests with elected officials. 162
Although Justice Thomas joined the majority's decision to strike down the prohibi-
tion on corporate expenditures, he dissented with respect to the majority's decision to
uphold the disclosure requirements.163 He stated that requiring disclosure of campaign
funding infringed on the most fundamental principles of the First Amendment's protec-
tion of free speech. 164 In his view, requiring political supporters to publicly disclose the
amount they spend leads to public criticism of a candidate's supporters as well as the
candidate himself. 165 Justice Thomas predicted that fear of this criticism would lead to
some campaign supporters choosing not to support a candidate, which he believed was
the result of disclosure requirements chilling speech. 166
The aftermath of the Court's decision in Citizens United included a variety of reac-
tions, but that of Senator Tom Udall from New Mexico was more than critical.167 Sena-
tor Udall found the overruling of the corporate expenditure prohibition remarkable con-
sidering the legislative findings of BCRA that showed the potential for corruption in
federal campaign funding.168 He further claimed that the decision created permissible
forms of corruption because its narrow view involved only actual corruption.169 Senator
Udall also noted that Citizens United displayed an unwillingness to show deference to
Congress despite its efforts to extend regulation of campaign finance since the Buckley
decision.170 One of the possible unfortunate results of Citizens United, he felt, was that it
would lead candidates to devote more time to campaign fundraising from private parties
159. See id. at 940.
160. Id. at 965.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 965-66.
163. Id at 980 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164. Id.
165. See id. at 982.
166. Id. at 982. Justice Thomas compared his opinion on disclosure requirements with the events concerning
the passing of Proposition 8 in California. He noted that both supporters and opponents of the amendment to
California's Constitution engaged in harassment and scare tactics through the public disclosure of money spent
for or against the amendments. Id. at 980-81.
167. Tom Udall, Amend the Constitution to Restore Public Trust in the Political System: A Practitioner's
Perspective on Campaign Finance Reform, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 235, 235-36 (2010). While Senator
Udall proposes amending the Constitution as the solution to the problems caused by the Court's decision, this
article does not focus on such a proposal.
168. Id. at 239.
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and negatively affect the public's view of corruption in the democratic system. 17 1
Those supporting the outcome believe Citizens United was predictable and unre-
markable.172 While there were signs that the Court was moving toward deregulation of
corporate involvement in campaigns, even those who do not agree that the decision's
holdings had strong implications must admit that Citizens United was bold for its com-
plete lifting of long-time regulations. 173 Further, this group cannot ignore the decision's
impact on state laws and elections. 174
III. OKLAHOMA CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
As previously mentioned, Oklahoma's current campaign finance laws strongly re-
semble those upheld by the Supreme Court before Citizens United.175 There are limits on
contributions an individual or family may contribute and penalties for violating these
limitations, but there are no limits on expenditures.176 The laws' different treatment of
contributions and expenditures incorporates the Buckley Court's distinction between the
two.177 The laws prohibit corporations from making independent expenditures and are
identical to regulations upheld in McConnell.178 Therefore, if a corporation wants to
make an expenditure in support of a political candidate, it can only do so through the
PAC option.179 This option allows a corporation to solicit money that is retained in a
fund separate from its general treasury fund, or PAC, established for the purpose of rais-
ing funds for the corporation's candidate of choice.180 Under this regulation, the fund
must be separate from the corporation's general treasury fund, the money must be donat-
ed for the fund's particular purpose of political campaign support, and donations to
PACs are subject to contribution limits.Isi
The rationale behind these limitations in Oklahoma incorporates the rationale the
Court relied on in upholding the federal limitations in McConnell.182 As the McConnell
Court noted, there are compelling reasons for prohibiting corporate independent expendi-
171. Id. See Warren Rudman & Timothy E. Wirth, Politicians in Congress Should Serve You, Not Rich Con-
tributors, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 24, 2010),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0524/Politicians-in-Congress-should-serve-you-not-
rich-contributors for a discussion of the decision of two White House legislators to not run for re-election due
in part to the current nature of campaign finance.
172. See generally Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 217
(2010).
173. See id. at 220. Levitt discusses the extension of corporate campaign funding rights addressed by the
Court's prior holdings in FEC v. Wis. Right To Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007) and First Nat'I Bank ofBos. v. Bellot-
ti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
174. See Life After Citizens United, supra note 82; see also Am. Tradition P'ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490
(2012) (holding that Montana's prohibition on corporate independent expenditures unconstitutional under Citi-
zens United).
175. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(2) (2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 187-187.2 (2012). See also McConnell v. FEC,
540 U.S. 93 (2003); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
176. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 187.1(A)(1)-(2), (E), (F).
177. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 55.
178. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 187.2(B)(1)-(2); see McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204.
179. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 187.2(B)(2).
180. Id.
181. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 §§ 187(7)(b)(3), 187.2(B)(2).
182. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(2) (2006); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204-07.
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tures, including protection of the shareholders' interests.183 For example, requiring a
separate segregated fund for corporate expenditures protects the interest of shareholders
in the corporation's profits who do not wish to donate to support or oppose a particular
candidate. 184
A more obvious reason for these limitations is the amount of money corporations
could potentially spend in campaign funding if these practices were left unregulated.185
The potential corruption made possible by a corporation's ability to buy political influ-
ence significantly decreases without its general treasury fund at its disposal for such pur-
poses.186 A corporation's total wealth, unlike that of an individual or small support
group, allows a corporation to support candidates through various costly media sources
(i.e., electioneering communications), such as television advertisements.187 If campaign
finance laws did not limit the funding of these ads, corporations could fund unlimited
political advertisements that focus only on the candidates or issues that serve the corpo-
rations' best interests.188 These unlimited advertisements could also mislead voters to
believe that the focus of the advertisements reflects the most important issues in the cur-
rent election. 189 Therefore, regulating corporate funding reduces corporations' control in
expensive media outlets and diminishes the risk that candidates ignore the contemporary
issues that concern individual constituents during elections. 190
IV. CAMPAIGN FINANCE WITH THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
A. The Potential for Corruption in Oklahoma
The need to regulate corporate funding and require disclosure in Oklahoma is nec-
essary to prevent the threat of corruption resulting from quid pro quo relationships be-
tween political officeholders and corporate supporters. 19 1 The risk of this occurring is
serious at both the state and federal levels because candidates feel obligated to act in the
best interest of those who comprise the primary source of their campaign message.1 92
Because corporations are often a primary source of support for campaign expenditures,
they potentially play a major role in helping candidates win elections. 193 Once in office,
corporations may influence an elected official as compensation for the corporate spend-
ing that initially helped elect the official. 194 This influence can take the form of legisla-
tion, political influence, and even access to other influential government officials. 195
183. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 207.
186. See id. at 204-05.
187. See id. at 207-08.
188. See id. at 207.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 115-17; LEGISLATIVE CHANGES, supra note 21, at 8.
192. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 115-17.
193. See id. at 115-16.
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Therefore, allowing unlimited corporate expenditures without public disclosure of their
sources would inevitably promote the interest of the few (the corporations) over the
many (all other constituents). 196
The proposed changes to Oklahoma's campaign finance laws pose a serious threat
of transforming all of these potential concerns into a reality.19 7 While corporations
would still be unable to make campaign contributions under the proposed law, they could
make their own unlimited independent expenditures. 198 Additionally, corporations can
form a PAC with other corporations for the sole purpose of making expenditures and
electioneering communications. 199 There is no limit on the source or amount of contribu-
tions to these types of PACs. 200 The ability to make unlimited expenditures without the
requirement of a separate fund increases both the amount of undisclosed money corpora-
tions can spend and the risk to the shareholders' interests in the corporations' profits. 20 1
To lessen the effects of unlimited corporate expenditures, strengthened disclosure
requirements could give the public access to information concerning the amount and
identity of campaign expenditures.202 The amendments drafted in 2011 by the OEC
would require all groups, including corporations, to disclose the amount spent and identi-
ty of those who finance both independent expenditures and electioneering communica-
tions.203 Corporations could still make unlimited expenditures, but the candidates or
causes corporations supported and the amount the corporations spent would be public
information.204 The voting public could therefore determine which candidates had the
strongest corporate support through these additional disclosure requirements. 205
On their face, the proposed expenditure changes may not seem as serious to those
who cannot ascertain any immediate, threatening effects.206 There are also some who
argue this outcome is unlikely because the non-corporate forum still contributes a fair
amount toward candidate advocacy.207 However, it is not the present effects that pose
the greatest threat to Oklahoma voters.208 It is the gradual future effects that could take
the political voice from Oklahoma constituents and place it in the hands of corporate ty-
rants.209 It is also difficult to ignore the dollar amounts readily available to corporations
and the realistic threat of corporate influence in political campaigns. lo To demonstrate
196. See id.; see generally LEGISLATIVE CHANGES, supra note 21.
197. See generally LEGISLATIVE CHANGES, supra note 21. As discussed in the background portion of this
article, these changes have not been adopted by the Oklahoma Legislature.
198. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES, supra note 21, at 5-6, 8, 12.
199. Id at 12.
200. Id
201. See id.




206. See generally LEGISLATIVE CHANGES, supra note 21.
207. Levitt, supra note 172, at 224.
208. Contra id.
209. Contra id.
210. See id. Levitt boldly claims other groups will not be affected by the power of corporations in candidate
advocacy. I say this statement is bold because Levitt makes this claim just after proposing a scenario in which
Exxon Mobil decides to use all of its $45 billion net income it has at its disposal to spend in campaign finance
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the impact of these changes, imagine a theoretical, yet plausible, situation that could
happen under the proposed amendments without the adoption of the proposed disclosure
requirements. 2 11
B. The Hypothetical Under the New Law
George Reynolds is a wealthy, well-known businessman and attorney. He spent the
first twenty years of his career moving his way up the corporate ladder at an Oklahoma
corporation called Weiser Energy Association ("WEA"). Throughout his career, Reyn-
olds obtained a reputation for being cut-throat, and he always oriented his goals around
what was best for business. After spending a few years in his position as director of
communications, Reynolds decided he would run for a seat in the Oklahoma Senate.
Reynolds has little interest in politics, but he is always interested in boosting his reputa-
tion for excellence, and he believes he will win the election with ease. More importantly,
he knows his corporate supporters have plans for his campaign.
Running against Reynolds is incumbent Jake Peters. Peters is not well-known, but
he managed to win his first race with the support of the majority of his constituents and a
small number of local organizations of which he is a member. Peters comes from a hum-
ble background and worked his way through college and law school. He always wanted
to work in public service because he truly believed in being a voice for the people. Peters
enjoys being a state senator and spent his first term advocating several causes that were
important to his constituents. While he recognizes the large corporate support for Reyn-
olds, Peters decides to fight for his seat and believes his hard work will show at the polls.
During the race, Reynolds's corporate supporters realize Peters only has a slight
majority of the constituents' support. To win over enough votes, WEA produces a docu-
mentary, entitled George Reynolds: The Real Oklahoman. The documentary depicts
Reynolds's life as a beloved rags-to-riches story. Throughout the film, Reynolds empha-
sizes his sympathy for the typical Oklahoman who lives modestly, provides for his fami-
ly, and goes to church every Sunday. In addition to the documentary, WEA produces
several campaign commercials that portray Reynolds in the same fashion.
Under the newly-enacted campaign finance laws, WEA easily funds the documen-
tary and advertisements through unlimited independent expenditures.212 It simply draws
directly from its general treasury (worth approximately $90 million).213 As long as WEA
is only paying for electioneering communications or independent expenditures in support
of Reynolds - as opposed to making contributions - the amount that WEA may spend
is unlimited.2 14 Also, if the documentary and advertisements do not expressly advocate
for Reynolds or against Peters, but merely relate to Reynolds as a candidate and are aired
outside the specified time frames, then WEA would not be required to disclose the
expenditures.
211. See generally LEGISLATIVE CHANGES, supra note 21. The following demonstration incorporates the
proposed changes identified in this source in the event they are adopted without the proposed disclosure re-
quirements.
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amount spent in expenditures, which could potentially be far more than the amount rep-
resented in public disclosure records. 2 15
While WEA is spending millions on expenditures from its general treasury, the
shareholders' interest is unprotected.216 One vulnerable shareholder of WEA is John
Roy. He is retired now but still has an interest in the company. Roy remembers when
WEA first started, and he is well acquainted with many of its high officials. Reynolds is
not, however, an official Roy remembers fondly. Years ago, Roy tried to get his brother,
Lynn, a job at WEA. Lynn did not possess the typical characteristics of a WEA employ-
ee, but he was ready to work hard in whatever position he could obtain.
On the way to his interview, Lynn ran into Reynolds. Reynolds took one glance at
Lynn and knew he was not meant to work at WEA. After Lynn's interview, Reynolds
urged the hiring officials not to hire Lynn. Lynn did not get the job, and he had a feeling
it was due in part to something Reynolds said. Roy learned of Reynolds' actions, and he
always blamed Reynolds for Lynn's failure.
Roy strongly disliked Reynolds and, for obvious reasons, did not want to donate to
his campaign. Under the new Oklahoma law, Roy's interest as a shareholder at WEA is
unprotected because WEA is not required to establish a separate segregated fund apart
from its general treasury fund to make campaign expenditures. 2 17 Therefore, while WEA
draws directly from its general treasury to pay for expenditures, Roy's interest in the
company is affected without his knowledge or consent. 2 18
Even with his loyal supporters' greatest efforts, Peters cannot compete with the
corporate backing Reynolds has from WEA. The documentary and commercials con-
vince a majority of the constituents that Reynolds is "just like them." Further, because
WEA is careful not to expressly advocate for Reynolds' election or for Peters' defeat, the
money actually spent by WEA to produce the documentary and commercials is not dis-
closed and remains unknown to the local constituents. 219 Without the knowledge of
Reynolds's significant corporate backing, the constituents believe the rags-to-riches story
depicted in the documentary and commercials. The money spent by WEA in independent
expenditures successfully wins votes for Reynolds through the repetitive message that he
has the same background and morals as the constituents and that he will surely do what
is best for Oklahoma while in office.
Reynolds settles into office and begins his duties as an Oklahoma Senator. A bill is
introduced before the Oklahoma Senate that proposes to increase regulation of landfills
in the state.220 Reynolds knows that WEA is in the process of getting state approval to
215. See id.
216. See generally id
217. See id
218. See generally id
219. See id.
220. See Former Senate President Pro Tem Mike Morgan and Two Others Charged with Conspiracy, Extor-
tion, and Bribery, THE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS OKLA. CITY Div. (Mar. 31, 2011),
http://www.fbi.gov/oklahomacity/press-releases/201 1/okO3311 .htm [hereinafter THE FED. BUREAU]. Reyn-
olds's actions in this section are loosely based on those discussed in this indictment summary. The main differ-
ence is that the former President Pro Tem in this case allegedly accepted money while in office in exchange for
his role in voting for or against certain legislation.
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build several landfills around the state. If passed, due to its extensive regulations, this
legislation would increase WEA's estimated cost of the landfills by twenty-five percent.
When the potential vote looks close, Reynolds advocates strongly against the bill be-
cause he feels indebted to WEA for its help in his campaign.221 With his skills in persua-
sion (and manipulation) from being a successful businessman, Reynolds miraculously
convinces just enough senators to vote against the bill.
Reynolds' next move is proposing his own bill before the Senate. This bill aims to
decrease regulations of state lakes and rivers by the Oklahoma Department of Agricul-
ture ("ODA"). Reynolds writes the bill after learning of the Oklahoma Water Resources
Board's report to the ODA that some of the lakes surrounding various WEA facilities
contained pollutants exceeding permissible levels. Although it is uncertain, the ODA be-
lieves further research could prove WEA is responsible for the pollution. If the regula-
tions remain unchanged, it will cost WEA millions to adopt new technology that will
lessen the pollutants emitted from these facilities. Reynolds's bill eliminates a number of
the regulations, thereby saving WEA from spending any money on changes.222 Once
again, Reynolds maintains his loyalty to WEA by getting the bill passed in both Houses
through his skills in persuasion.
One of the lakes affected by a WEA facility is located in Reynolds's district. The
lake does not pose any present danger, but over time the effects of the pollutants grow.
For now, Reynolds's constituents have no knowledge that their own senator put their
health at risk by returning a favor to a wealthy corporation.
Reynolds spends the rest of his term advocating the most important causes to WEA
and similar companies. However, much of this legislation is not highly publicized be-
cause Reynolds only publicly discusses the few pieces of legislation he helps pass that
are actually of interest to his constituents. This legislation includes minor increases in the
funding of state highway construction projects and a law that makes it illegal to text and
drive. The publicity concerning his vote on these bills sustains his positive image in the
minds of his constituents. On the other hand, he does not speak publicly about his legis-
lative actions that benefitted WEA. Therefore, Reynolds maintains the support of his
constituents while he simultaneously repays WEA for its help in his election.
C. Changes in Federal Elections
While the preceding hypothetical is fictional, the likelihood of such events will in-
crease with the enactment of the proposed amendments to Oklahoma campaign finance
laws without the simultaneous enactment of stronger disclosure provisions. 22 3 The im-
pact of similar laws at the federal level is already apparent due to increasing evidence of
corporate funding in federal elections.224 Although Congress has not amended federal
law to conform to the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United, the FEC gave corpo-
221. See LEGISLATIVE CHANGES, supra note 21; THE FED. BUREAU, supra note 220.
222. See THE FED. BUREAU, supra note 220.
223. See LEGISLATIVE CHANGES, supra note 21; PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 20, at 8-10.
224. See R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., No. 257511174, THE STATE OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE
POLICY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2011).
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rations the go-ahead to make unlimited independent expenditures after issuing two advi-
sory opinions in the spring of 2010.225 As a result, an April 2011 report to Congress stat-
ed that corporations and labor unions began making independent expenditures during the
summer of 2010.226 The report also disclosed that the abolishment of prohibitions on
corporate expenditures suggests that corporations could have more influence in future
campaign funding than the political parties themselves.227
Studies reflecting the increase in non-party funding provide additional support for
this suggestion.228 A November 2010 study from the Campaign Finance Institute
showed that funding of electioneering communications and independent expenditures by
non-political parties rose from $119 million to $280 million, which is an increase of
135%.229 The report also noted that groups known as "super PACs," which are formed
by corporations or other organizations for the sole purpose of making independent ex-
penditures, increased dramatically. 230 The vast majority of these groups did not emerge
until after the Citizens United decision.231 The groups spent an estimated $84.6 million
in independent expenditures during 2010 alone.232 One such group is the super PAC
American Crossroads, whose 2010 independent expenditures totaled around $21.5 mil-
lion.233 The report suggests that, due to the lifting of prohibitions on corporations in Citi-
zens United, groups such as Crossroads received donations from a wider variety of con-
tributors, including corporations.234
Several reasons provided in the report attribute the growth in independent expendi-
tures to factors outside the lifting of the ban on corporate expenditures.235 These reasons
include the steady rise in campaign funding over the years and the fact that the 2010
elections involved the replacement of many incumbent seats.236 However, the reported
spending during this election may not be entirely accurate because disclosure require-
ments do not cover money spent on issue advocacy, and the lack of disclosure may also
extend to money that is spent on both express and issue advocacy. 237
With the ability to make unlimited independent expenditures and escape disclosure
requirements through the use of issue advocacy, the money spent by outside groups
reached an unprecedented amount in the 2012 presidential election.238 Conservative
225. Id. at 5.
226. Id.
227. Id at 8-9.
228. Id. at 9.
229. Id
230. Id; see SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding - shortly after Citizens
United - that the First Amendment prohibited limitation of corporate campaign contributions to committees
that only make independent expenditures).




235. See id. at 10.
236. Id
237. Id at 12.
238. See Kevin Quealy & Derek Willis, Independent Spending Totals, N.Y. TIMES,
http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/campaign-finance/independent-expenditures/totals (last visited Jan. 10,
2013) for the spending totals of super PACs during the 2012 election that are updated daily.
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groups alone spent over $700 million in independent expenditures in an effort to gain
control of the White House.239 Because these conservative groups were unsuccessful in
their attempted takeover even with the help of wealthy donors, some believe that Citizens
United was not the landmark decision as originally predicted.240
Voters may wonder what effects - if any - the funding from super PACs will
have in their future voting experience in federal elections due to their inability to imple-
ment major changes in the 2012 presidential election.241 The answer depends on the
ability of the voting population to remain informed of the true supporters behind every
individual candidate's campaign.242 Although corporate expenditures rose dramatically
after the Citizens United decision, the PACs they donate to are still required to disclose
their donors in many cases. 243 There is also hope that disclosure requirements in the fed-
eral system will be strengthened to curtail the effects of Citizens United.244 Therefore,
information regarding which federal candidates have the strongest corporate support re-
mains available, and it is in the best interest of every voter to seek such information and
not rely on the fanciful campaign ads and other tactics employed by corporate support-
ers.24 5
Publicly disclosed campaign information is beneficial to voters who vote strictly
by party affiliation, as well as voters who prefer candidates with individualized goals.246
In the first case, disclosure of a candidate's financial supporters will allow voters to dis-
cern whether the candidate is truly aligned with a particular party's interests or whether
the candidate is hiding behind the party's ideology to disguise his influence from his
wealthiest corporate supporters.247 In the latter case, voters benefit from publicly dis-
closed campaign funds in a similar manner by determining whether the candidate's pro-
posed ideas may be subject to the influence from corporations that support his cam-
paign.248 Public disclosure is important in both cases because of the enhanced ability of
outside groups to gain political influence through unlimited funding as a result of Citi-
239. Paul Blumenthal, Super PACs, Outside Money Influenced, But Didn't Buy the 2012 Election,




242. See Eric Posner, Citizens United is Still Worth Hating Even Though Fat-Cat Super PACs Lost at the
Polls, SLATE (Nov. 9, 2012, 11:55 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and.politics/view-from chicago/2012/1 1/campaign finance in 2012_pre
sidentialelection superpacslost but citizens.html (noting that even with the major losses of the Republican
party, "[s]ome Democrats did lose, and super PAC money may have made a difference").
243. See GARRETT, supra note 224, at 12; see also 2012 Independent Expenditures, FED. ELECTION
COMM'N, http://www.fec.gov/data/IndependentExpenditure.do?format-html&electionyr-2012 (last visited
Jan. 10, 2013).
244. See GARRETT, supra note 224, at 12.
245. See Blumenthal, supra note 239 ("It would be a big mistake to judge whether we have a corrupt cam-
paign finance system today by the outcome of any of these elections. This is just the beginning.") (quoting Fred
Wertheimer, president of Democracy 21, a major campaign finance reform group); Posner, supra note 242
("The real harm in Citizens United is its suggestion that when we spot problems in our electoral system, we are
helpless to fix them.").
246. See GARRETT, supra note 224, at 12.
247. See id.; see also Blumenthal, supra note 239 (discussing Mitt Romney's shift to the more conservative
side during the primary election).
248. See id. at 10, 12.
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zens United.24 9
Disclosed or not, it is safe to assume that corporate independent expenditures will
only increase in future federal elections.250 With the Supreme Court invalidating the
prohibition on corporate expenditures and the national parties struggling with their own
funds due to the slow-recovering economy, it is likely that federal candidates' depend-
ence on corporations to fund their campaign messages will only increase.251 The ease
with which corporations form such co-dependent relationships with federal candidates
through campaign support makes the potential for corruption a more realistic possibility
than in any federal election since before Congress passed FECA.252 The potential for
corruption in these relationships begins with the corporation's power in a candidate's
campaign through unregulated spending, and inevitably ends with the corporation's abil-
ity to exert secret influence over the elected official's actions in office.253 Unfortunately,
states with laws identical to those in the federal system concerning corporate independ-
ent expenditures, as well as states that will enact identical laws in the future, face the
possibility of similar corporate influence. 254
D. What the Future Holds
As evidenced by the current studies of the effects of Citizens United on federal
elections, the proposed amendments to Oklahoma law that allow unlimited corporate in-
dependent expenditures pose serious changes in campaign funding practices in the state's
elections if additional disclosure requirements are not also enacted.255 Although the
amendments did not pass in the spring 2011 legislative session, it is only a matter of time
before Oklahoma joins the other states that have already adopted similar amendments. 256
Oklahoma corporations are currently permitted to make unlimited expenditures in the
state without fear of criminal prosecution due to the policy of the former Attorney Gen-
257eral not to enforce the current laws shortly after Citizens United. Therefore, the main
concern is how the rise in corporate influence will affect the state's elections, and what,
if anything, can be done to counter-balance these effects. 258
The permissible method for corporations to influence political candidates under the
proposed expenditure amendments, and the effects thereof, work much like the story of
Reynolds discussed above.259 To support a candidate, a corporation could make expendi-
249. See id.
250. See Quealy & Willis, supra note 238.
251. See Blumenthal, supra note 239.
252. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976) (discussing Congress's intent to decrease the potential
of corruption by regulating campaign finance practices).
253. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 129-32 (2003) (discussing the desire of wealthy contributors to
influence legislative decisions to their advantage).
254. See Life After Citizens United, supra note 82; see also Am. Tradition P'ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490
(2012).
255. See LEGISLATIVE CHANGES, supra note 21, at 12; see also PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 20, at
8-10.
256. See Price, supra note 16; see also Life After Citizens United, supra note 82.
257. Adcock, supra note 67.
258. See LEGISLATIVE CHANGES, supra note 21, at 12.
259. See id.; see also discussion supra Part IV.B.
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tures in a variety of media, including advertisements, flyers, or brochures. 260 The funds
for these expenditures could be drawn directly from the corporation's profits in its gen-
eral treasury fund.261 By allowing a corporation to draw directly from its profits without
disclosing the corporation's role, as opposed to requiring the establishment of a separate
segregated fund, a corporation can spend as much money behind the scenes as it desires.
The role of corruption enters this process in two ways. First, the potential amount
in independent expenditures a corporation could spend in support of a candidate would
be unlimited due to the fact that limits on expenditures are unconstitutional.262 As in
Reynolds' case, an elected official may feel indebted to a corporation that spent a large
amount in expenditures during his campaign.263 Although the elected official may not
engage in acts of outright corruption by accepting money in exchange for political fa-
vors, the official could participate in a less apparent form of corruption by allowing this
feeling of indebtedness to affect his actions in office. 264 For example, the official may
make legislative decisions that would benefit the corporation, as opposed to the official's
constituents, which could last throughout the official's elected term. 265 Under the state's
current disclosure requirements, the money corporations spend in support of a particular
candidate may not even be disclosed if the corporation claims the donation was not made
for a political purpose.266 This method of avoiding disclosure may prevent the public
from recognizing the corporate motivation many legislative decisions - be they minus-
cule or of great significance - until long after the elected official is out of office.267
Thus, the question of who to hold accountable for legislative decisions resulting from the
rise of corporate influence would only be answerable through amended disclosure re-
quirements, which would require future politicians to handle any public dissatisfac-
tion.2 68
The second method in which the role of corruption enters is through the potential
for quid pro quo relationships to occur in the absence of the disclosure requirements. 269
The potential for the elected official to act in furtherance of corporate interests would be
unknown to the public due to the ability of corporations to make unlimited expenditures
under the new law without additional disclosure requirements.270 This method involves
the distinction between express and issue advocacy.271 For instance, a corporation could
make an expenditure such as a brochure that states "Vote for Reynolds" on the front and
260. See LEGISLATIVE CHANGES, supra note 21, at 8 (amending OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 187(7)(b)(8) (2012)).
261. See id. at 12 (amending OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 187.2 (2012)).
262. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 187(8) (2012); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976).
263. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
264. See id.
265. See id.
266. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, ch. 62, App. §§ 257:10-1-14(a)(13), 257:1-1-2 (2012).
267. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 20, at 8-10.
268. See id.
269. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, ch. 62, App. § 257:10-1-13 (2012) for the current disclosure requirements of
contributions and expenditures.
270. See generally LEGISLATIVE CHANGES, supra note 21.
271. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(iii) (2012) (codifying the distinction between issue and express advocacy and
their respective disclosure requirements in the federal election system); OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, ch. 62, App. §
257:10-1-13 (2012) (applying the same distinction in Oklahoma).
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is mailed to all the constituents in the district Reynolds is running in.272 This would be a
form of express advocacy because it calls for the election of a particular candidate.273 In
making this expenditure, the corporation would be required to disclose the amount it
spent under the state's campaign disclosure requirements.274 If the same brochure did
not expressly call for the election or defeat of Reynolds, but instead listed some of his
past achievements and highlighted his ideas for improving Oklahoma politics, then the
brochure would be considered issue advocacy.275 Because in this case the brochure only
relates to an identified candidate and does not call for his election or defeat (thereby
making the brochure issue advocacy), the corporation would not be required to disclose
the amount it spent on producing and distributing the brochures if it issued the brochure
outside the specified time frame.276 Therefore, under the proposed amendments, the cor-
poration could spend an unlimited amount of money on expenditures in the form of issue
advocacy outside the time frame specified for disclosure of electioneering communica-
tions, and, without the enactment of additional disclosure requirements, the corporation's
influence would be kept from the public's knowledge. 277
With the inevitable enactment of the proposed amendments in the future, the only
way to lessen the potential for corruptive corporate influence is through the simultaneous
amendment of the state's disclosure requirements.278 Although the disclosure require-
ments upheld in Citizens United make the money spent on electioneering communica-
tions public knowledge, there are no present disclosure requirements in the federal sys-
tem to account for corporate independent expenditures outside the specified time
frame. 279 The enactment of strengthened disclosure requirements, however, would pre-
vent Oklahoma corporations from supporting candidates through issue advocacy expend-
itures to avoid disclosure and protect the candidates' reputation from being tied to corpo-
rate interests.2 80 Because such disclosure requirements would identify the source and
amount spent in these types of expenditures, the threat of corporate influence would de-
crease through the constituents' knowledge of who is really supporting each candidate
(and vice versa).281 The disclosure of corporate expenditures would at least make the
amount corporations spend in support of a candidate available to the public.282 At that
272. See discussion supra Part VI.B.
273. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(iii) (2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, ch. 62, App. § 257:10-1-13 (2012). If the
brochure were still in support of Reynolds, but stated "Do not vote for Peters" on the front, it would also quali-
fy as express advocacy because it clearly calls for the defeat of a particular candidate.
274. OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, ch. 62, App. § 257:10-1-13 (2012); see LEGISLATIVE CHANGES, supra note 21.
275. OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, ch. 62, App. § 257:10-1-13 (2012) (requiring only disclosure of expenditures that
call for the election or defeat of an identified candidate).
276. See id.; see also LEGISLATIVE CHANGES, supra note 21, at 8.
277. See LEGISLATIVE CHANGES, supra note 21, at 12; see also PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 20, at
8-10.
278. See sources cited, supra note 277.
279. See 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2012) for the current disclosure requirements for federal elections. See GARRETT,
supra note 224, at 10-12 (discussing the lack of disclosure of corporate independent expenditures in the after-
math of Citizens United).
280. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 20, at 8-10; see also supra note 81 (discussing the inadequa-
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point, it would then be the voting public's responsibility to use the available information
when making voting decisions and to know the real interests each candidate promotes.
In the event the state's disclosure requirements are amended along with the new
laws for corporate independent expenditures, a corporation could decide to sue the State
of Oklahoma on the same grounds that Justice Thomas would have invalidated the dis-
283closure requirements upheld in Citizens United. This argument would involve the
corporation's claim that these laws substantially infringe on its First Amendment right to
freedom of speech by chilling speech because requiring disclosure might persuade some
groups to not support any candidate or cause.284 In response, a court should hold that
disclosure requirements serve a compelling governmental interest by allowing Oklahoma
voters access to information regarding each candidate's supporters, and thus, allow vot-
ers to make informed decisions in the best interest of the state. 2 85 This response to an at-
tack on disclosure is likely to prevail both because the Supreme Court continues to up-
hold the constitutionality of disclosure requirements - even in cases subsequent to
Citizens United286 - and because allowing the public to have access to this information
is the only way to prevent instances like that of Reynolds from becoming the routine
practice of corporate-supported candidates in Oklahoma elections.
V. CONCLUSION: WHERE CITIZENS UNITED WILL LEAD OKLAHOMA
After a long history of reform, Citizens United unraveled the efforts of previous
generations to decrease the role of corporations in our election system.287 One can only
imagine the disappointment of President Roosevelt, after advocating the Tillman Act, to
see the Supreme Court hold that corporate independent expenditures are protected by the
First Amendment.288 The unprecedented power of corporations authorized by this hold-
ing threatens the public's knowledge of how unlimited corporate support leads to corrup-
tive relationships in which politicians further corporate interests.289 With the federal sys-
tem's implementation of corporate independent expenditures and many states following
suit, the need for disclosure of corporate spending becomes more and more necessary to
increase the public's awareness of corporate influence in politics.290 Without the disclo-
283. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876, 980 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
284. See id. at 980-82 ("Disclaimer and disclosure requirements enable private citizens and elected officials
to implement political strategies specifically calculated to curtail campaign-related activity and prevent the
lawful, peaceful exercise of First Amendment rights.").
285. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 20, at 8-10; see also supra notes 246-54 (discussing the im-
portance of disclosure).
286. See Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2837 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Requiring people to stand up in
public for their political acts fosters civic courage, without which democracy is doomed.").
287. See supra notes 134-74 (discussing the Court's decision in Citizens United and the implications of this
ruling).
288. See supra notes 32-34 (discussing President Roosevelt's advocacy for the Tillman Act); see also supra
notes 140-44 (discussing the Court's protection of corporate speech under the First Amendment in Citizens
United).
289. See supra notes 235-40 (discussing the ability of corporations to spend large expenditures without dis-
closure to the public in the federal election system).
290. See supra notes 246-54 (discussing the effects of the Citizens United holding and the need for disclo-
sure); see also supra notes 278-85 (discussing the need for strengthened disclosure requirements to be enacted
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sure of corporate spending, the ability of corporations to make unlimited expenditures
from their general treasury funds as a result of Citizens United could corrupt state and
federal elections by minimizing the voices of constituents while promoting corporate
ideology.
The proposed amendments to Oklahoma's campaign finance laws raise the same
potential influence of corporations already taking place in the federal system. The poten-
tial for the new law to allow politicians such as Reynolds to run in state elections in fur-
therance of corporate interests without the public's knowledge makes the simultaneous
enactment of strengthened disclosure requirements all the more necessary. To prevent
the overwhelming influence of wealthy outside groups such as corporations, it will be up
to Oklahoma voters to make use of the disclosure of every candidate's campaign practic-
es and to remain informed of each candidate's true ideology. In the aftermath of Citizens
United, informed voter participation is the only method to prevent the potential for cor-
porate influence in state and federal elections.
-Rachael F. Hughes
with the amendments to corporate expenditures).
* Many thanks to all of the Editors of the Tulsa Law Review for their assistance with this article, everyone
at the Federal Election Commission for allowing me to further study issues in campaign finance, and to my
mother for her helpful comments and, most of all, for her inspiration.
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